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Abstract
This article describes some dynamic aspects on dynastic utility incorporating two-sided
altruism with an OLG setting. We analyzed the special case where the weights of two-
sided altruism are dynamically inconsistent. The Bellman equation for two-sided altruism
proves to be reduced to one-sided dynamic problem, but the e®ective discount factor is
di®erent only in the current generation. We show that a contraction mapping result of value
function cannot be achieved in general, and that there can locally exist an in¯nite number of
self-consistent policy functions with distinct steady states (indeterminacy of self-consistent
policy functions).
Keywords: Bellman equation, Two-sided altruism, Dynamic inconsistency, Self-consistent
policy functions, Indeterminacy, Overlapping generations model.
JEL classi¯cation: C61, D91, O41.
AMS Mathematical Subject Classi¯cation: 39A30, 39A99, 49K99, 74G30, 91B02.
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes some mothematical aspects of two sided altruism dynamics especially
under dynamic inconsistency, with constant fertility and no saving. The model is based
on so-called Buiter-Carmichael-Burbidge (BCB) type two-sided utility, which we modify for
the three stage OLG model, so that each generation might hold, in general, two chances of
intergenerational linkage, ¯rstly through fertility and capital investment decision planned
by middle age parent during young adulthood, and secondly through transfer (compensa-
tion/bequest) during old stage. As explained later, this modi¯cation proves to induce some
peculiar, even puzzling behaviors in macro-dynamics, especially under dynamic inconsis-
tency.
As references, two-sided altruism dynamics are treated, for example, in Abel (1987), Kim-
ball (1987), Hori and Kanaya (1989), Altig and Davis (1993), Hori (1997), Aoki (2011). Fur-
thermore, the di®erentiability of value functions is discussed in Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979), Santos (1991), Araujo (1991), Montrucchio (1987). Mathematical treatments re-
garding the principle of optimality appear, for example, Bellman (1957), Pontryagin (1962),
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Blackwell (1965), Stokey and Lucas (1989), and Mitra (2000). Boldrin and Montrucchio
(1986), and Geanakoplos and Brown (1985) are located at the earlier stage among the \in-
determinacy of equilibrium" literature.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We describe the model in section 2, and
theoretical results in section 3, and ¯nally concluding remarks in section 4.
2. Model
We assume a typical OLG model consisting of three life stages, C, Y , O (childhood, young
adulthood (working age) and old adulthood (retirement stage)). Generation t, who spends
its young adulthood (stage Y ) at period t, shares the adjacent life stages with generation
t + 1 and t ¡ 1. (For example, stage O of old parents and stage Y of young children are
shared simultaneously.) The whole life utility of generation t is de¯ned as ut = u
(y)
t + ±u
(o)
t+1,
where u(y)t and u
(o)
t+1 are the young and old adulthood utility of generation t, respectively,
and ± is a time preference discount factor for old (retirement) stage. At period t, generation
t decides some of its life strategies, fertility (nt) and capital investment for children (kt+1)
and saving for forthcoming retirement stage O (st), and gift for old parents (bt). Just for
simplicity, we assume that fertility is constant (nt = 1) and there is no saving (st = 0), and
that only the gift for old parents is controllable.
2.1 Representative agent problem
Now we consider the following type of two sided altruism, where Vt and ut is an (two-sided)
dynastic utility and an individual life utility of generation t, respectively.
Vt = ®±u
(o)
t +
1X
s=0
¯sut+s
= ®±u(o)t +
1X
s=0
¯s
³
u
(y)
t+s + ±u
(o)
t+1+s
´
= ®±u(o)t +
³
u
(y)
t + ±u
(o)
t+1
´
+ ¯
³
u
(y)
t+1 + ±u
(o)
t+2
´
+ ¯2
³
u
(y)
t+2 + ±u
(o)
t+3
´
+ ¢ ¢ ¢ .
This representation is an OLG version of Buiter-Carmichael-Burbidge (BCG) type utility
of the form, Vt = ®ut¡1+ ut+
P1
s=1 ¯
sut+s. (As for the BCG utility, see Abel (1987)). We
assume ¯ < 1.
Now denote consumptions at stage Y (period t) and O (period t+ 1) of generation t, by
c1;t and c2;t+1, respectively. Then c1;t = f(kt) ¡ kt+1 ¡ bt and c2;t+1 = bt+1, where f(¢)
is a production function, kt is a human capital of generation t with a full depreciation in
one period, and bt+1 is a gift from young adult generation t + 1 to old adult generation t.
Assuming the intertemporally separable utility form, u(c) = c1¡¾=(1 ¡ ¾) for ¾ 6= 1, and
ln c for ¾ = 1, we have u(y)t = u(c1;t) and u
(o)
t+1 = u(c2;t+1).
If all the period t and subsequent strategies fbt0 ; kt0+1g1t0=t are independently determined
by generation t, then the generation solves the following representative agent problem.
max
fkt0+1;bt0g1t0=t
Vt (RA1)
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However, in this OLG linkage, the inconsistent motive for intergenerational transfer be-
tween young children and old parents makes each generation behave di®erently from RA1.
To see why, we rewrite Vt as
Vt =
³
u
(y)
t + ®±u
(o)
t
´
+ ¯
³
u
(y)
t+1 + (±=¯)u
(o)
t+1
´
+ ¯2
³
u
(y)
t+2 + (±=¯)u
(o)
t+2
´
+ ¢ ¢ ¢
=
³
u
(y)
t + ®±u
(o)
t
´
+
1X
s=1
¯s
³
u
(y)
t+s + (±=¯)u
(o)
t+s
´
.
Maximizing Vt in RA1 necessarily assures that the ratio of marginal utility in consumption
between young and old adults be 1 : ®± at period t, while 1 : ±=¯ at period t0 (t0 =
t+1; t+2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ). As a matter of fact, however, all generations t0(¸ t) are to adjust their gifts
and allocate their consumptions with old parents by 1 : ®± in the ratio of marginal utility.
Therefore, the corresponding representative agent problem should be rather the following
sequential problem.
max
fkt0+1;b^t0g1t0=t
Vt (RA2)
s:t: b^t0 = argmax
bt0
fu(y)t0 + ®±u(o)t0 g given kt0 and kt0+1, t0 = t; t+ 1; t+ 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ .
A solution of the constraint, b^t0 (t0 = t; t+ 1; t+ 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ); can be derived explicitly as b^t0 =
1
1+(®±)¡1=¾ ff(kt0)¡ kt0+1g, so de¯ning c^1;t0 ´ f(kt0)¡kt0+1¡b^t0 = 11+(®±)1=¾ ff(kt0)¡ kt0+1g
and c^2;t0 ´ b^t0 = (®±)
1=¾
1+(®±)1=¾
ff(kt0)¡ kt0+1g, we have u(c^1;t0) + ®±u(c^2;t0) ´ Au( ~Ct0) and
u(c^1;t0) + (±=¯)u(c^2;t0) ´ Bu( ~Ct0), where A ´
©
1 + (®±)1=¾
ª¾
, B ´ f1+(®±)
1=¾(®¯)¡1g
f1+(®±)1=¾g1¡¾ , and
~Ct0 ´ f(kt0)¡ kt0+1.
Thus de¯ning V¸t, which internalized the old age support by each generation according to
the 1 : ®± rule, b^t0 = argmax
bt0
n
u
(y)
t0 + ®±u
(o)
t0
o
,
V¸t = Au( ~Ct) + ¯Bu( ~Ct+1) + ¯2Bu( ~Ct+2) + ¯3Bu( ~Ct+3) + ¢ ¢ ¢
= Afu( ~Ct) + ¯¹u( ~Ct+1) + ¯2¹u( ~Ct+2) + ¯3¹u( ~Ct+3) + ¢ ¢ ¢ g,
where ¹ = B=A. Here ¹ = 1 if ®¯ = 1 (dynamically consistent). Thus the e®ective discount
factor is ¯¹ at the present period t, but ¯ from the next period t+ 1.
Finally RA2 can be simply rewritten as
max
fkt0+1g1t0=t
V¸t. (RA2')
It is obvious that RA2' or RA2 are equivalent with RA1 if and only if ¹ = 1 (i:e:; ®¯ = 1).
We call this case (¹ = 1) dynamic consistency, and otherwise inconsistency. From time
consistency requirement ® = 1¡
p
1¡4ab
2b ; ¯ =
1¡p1¡4ab
2a (ab · 1=4), we have ®¯ < 1,
therefore ¹ > 1, that is, the model is dynamically inconsistent. See Kimball (1987), Hori et
al. (1989) and Hori (1997).
2.2 Functional Bellman Equation
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Now we try to rewrite the representative agent problem represented in RA2', in the form
of recursive functional Bellman equation.
At ¯rst, we de¯ne another objective function ~Vt,
~Vt = Bu( ~Ct) + ¯Bu( ~Ct+1) + ¯2Bu( ~Ct+2) + ¯3Bu( ~Ct+3) + ¢ ¢ ¢
= Bfu( ~Ct) + ¯u( ~Ct+1) + ¯2u( ~Ct+2) + ¯3u( ~Ct+3) + ¢ ¢ ¢ g,
where
~Vt = V¸t + (B ¡A)u( ~Ct).
Then two sided altruism dynamics is described as the following one sided functional equa-
tion, where two value functions W¸t(¢) and ~Wt(¢) correspond with objective functions V¸t and
~Vt, respectively.
W¸t(kt) = max
0·kt+1·f(kt)
³
Au(f(kt)¡ kt+1) + ¯ ~Wt+1(kt+1)
´
, (BE1)
where
~Wt(kt) = W¸t(kt) + (B ¡A)u(C^t)
and C^t = f(kt)¡ k^t+1, where k^t+1 = argmax
0·kt+1·f(kt)
³
Au(f(kt)¡ kt+1) + ¯ ~Wt+1(kt+1)
´
.
k^t+1 = gt(kt) is a policy function of generation t, given next generation t+1's value func-
tions W¸t+1(¢) and ~Wt+1(¢). BE1 is a simpler version of two sided altruism model examined
by Hori (1997), eqs. (4.2)-(4.6).
Unfortunately, in case of dynamic inconsistency (¹ 6= 1), BE1 is not necessarily equivalent
with RA2' (or RA2), although RA2' also internalizes the e®ect of dynamic inconsistency
on intergenerational transfer between young adult and old parents during each period. The
reason is as follows. In RA2', the indirect e®ect of dynamic inconsistency in subsequent
generations on the current generation's policy function is not still taken account of, while
BE1 successfully internalizes both intra-temporal direct e®ect on intergenerational transfer
and inter-temporal indirect e®ect on preceding generations' policy functions, both caused
by dynamic inconsistency. However, this complete internalization induces some perplexing
aspects in BE1, which does not appear in case of dynamic consistency.
To see this, we now rewrite BE1 in a backwardly recursive fashion.
W¸n+1(k) = max
y2Y (k)
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~Wn(y)
´
, (BE1')
where
~Wn+1(k) = W¸n+1(k) + (B ¡A)u(C^).
n is a time distance from the future terminal period n = 0. Here C^ = f(k) ¡ y^, where
y^ = argmax
y
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~Wn(y)
´
´ gn+1(k). Y (k) is a feasible correspondence de¯ned
as Y (k) = f y j 0 · y · f(k)g.
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In case of dynamic consistency (¹ = B=A = 1), the above equation reduces to a regular
Bellman equation,
Wn+1(k) = max
y2Y (k)
(Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯Wn(y)) ;
where Wn(¢) = ~Wn(¢) = W¸n(¢).
Then, under quite general conditions, the principle of optimality is known to assure a
uniform convergence of Wn(¢) to time-independent value function W (¢), which satis¯es
W (k) = max
y2Y (k)
(Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯W (y)) .
In case of dynamic inconsistency (¹ 6= 1), such a contraction mapping result, for example,
by Blackwell (1965), cannot be automatically expected. However roughly dare to consider,
at any events, the following time-independent functional equation.
W¸ (k) = max
y2Y (k)
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~W (y)
´
, (BE2)
where
~W (k) = W¸ (k) + (B ¡A)u(C^),
and C^ = f(k)¡ y^ and y^ = argmax
y2Y (k)
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~W (y)
´
´ g(k).
So far we assume a priori the existence of policy function gn(k) instead of policy corre-
spondence, implicitly its di®erentiability, the uniform convergence of convergence of gn(k)
to g(k), and so on. See, for example, Stokey et al. (1989). Some of these conditions prove
to hold even under dynamic inconsistency, but some do not. In the next section, we will
investigate the analytical properties of BE2 and BE1' from various viewpoints.
3. Results
Let be R+ = fx 2 Rjx ¸ 0g and de¯ne K ½ R+, the domain of capital k, so that k 2 K.
Also assume that f : R+ ! R+ and u : R+ ! R+ are di®erentiable and satisfy the following
properties:
Assumptions:
F0: Production function f(k) is C1, i.e., in¯nitely continuously di®erentiable.
F1: f(0) = 0.
F2: f is strictly concave.
F3: f 0(k) > 0.
F4: lim
k!0
f 0(k) =1, lim
k!1
f 0(k) = 0.
U0: Utility function u(c) is C1, i.e., in¯nitely continuously di®erentiable. Speci¯cally
u(c) = c1¡¾=(1¡ ¾) for ¾ 6= 1, where ¾ is a relative risk aversion or an inverse of elasticity
of intertemporal substitution.
U1: u(0) = 0.
U2: u is strictly concave.
U3: u0(c) > 0 for c > 0.
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U4: lim
c!0
u0(c) =1, lim
c!1u
0(c) = 0.
Theorem 1 derives a modi¯ed Euler equation corresponding with two-sided altruism.
Theorem 1: In BE2 assume that value function ~W (k) and policy function y^ = g(k)
are C1, i.e., once continuously di®erentiable, and that y^ = g(k) is an interior of the feasible
correspondence Y (k). Then BE2 satis¯es the following Euler equation EE1, modi¯ed for
case of dynamic inconsistency.
¡u0(f(k)¡ y) + ¯u0(f(y)¡ g(y)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(y)] = 0, (EE1)
where y = g^(k) is a solution of EE1.
Proof is trivial and left for Appendix. Then time consistency requires that it happens to
be g^(k) = g(k). Therefore EE1 can be rewritten as
¡u0((f ¡ g)(k)) + ¯u0((f ¡ g) ± g(k)) [(¹f 0 ¡ (¹¡ 1)g0) ± g(k)] = 0, (EE2)
where a ± b(x) ´ a(b(x)) denotes a composite function of x, and (a§ b)(x) ´ a(x)§ b(x).
If g(k) satis¯es EE2, then we say g(k) is self-consistent, in the sense that if next gen-
eration's policy function is g(k), then the current generation necessarily takes the same
policy.
At a ¯xed point, k = k¤, g(k¤) = k¤ and ¡u0(c¤) + ¯u0(c¤)[¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] = 0,
where c¤ = f(k¤)¡k¤. Thus ¯[¹f 0(k¤)¡(¹¡1)g0(k¤)] = 1 (F) holds. Note that ¯f 0(k¤) = 1
implies g0(k¤) = 1=¯, and that ¯¹f 0(k¤) = 1 implies g0(k¤) = 0.
3.1 Indeterminacy of self-consistent policy functions
Next theorem relates dynamic inconsistency with indeterminacy of self-consistent policy
functions.
Theorem 2: Assume ¹ 6= 1. Let ¹k be a point such that ¯¹f 0(¹k) = 1, and take any point
such that k¤ 6= ¹k. Then, there exists uniquely a self-consistent policy function g(k) satisfying
EE2, such that it has a ¯xed point at k = k¤, and is C1, i.e., in¯nitely continuously
di®erentiable, on some open ball around k¤, k 2 B(k¤; "), i.e., k¤ ¡ " < k < k¤ + ", with
" > 0.
Proof is given in Appendix. This theorem says that if a ¯xed point k¤ is determined, then
a corresponding self-consistent policy function is also uniquely determined and C1 in an
open ball around k¤. Since there exists a trade-o® and degree of freedom between the values
of g(k¤) and g0(k¤), it is possible to construct an in¯nite number of distinct self-consistent
policy functions for distinct k¤.
3.2 Existence of C1 self -consistent value functions with uniform convergence
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Given a self-consistent policy function g(k) satisfying EE2, self-consistent value functions
~Z(k) and Z¸(k), which correspond with ~W (k) and W¸ (k), respectively, are de¯ned as the
following in¯nite functional series.
~Z(k) = Bfu((f ¡ g)(k)) + ¯u(f ¡ g) ± g(k)) + ¯2u((f ¡ g) ± g ± g(k)) + ¢ ¢ ¢ g (SV1)
= B
P1
s=0¯
su((f ¡ g)± g ± ¢ ¢ ¢ ± g| {z }(k)
s
)
= B
P1
s=0¯
su((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k))
and
Z¸(k) = ~Z(k)¡ (B ¡A)u((f ¡ g)(k)).
Here we de¯ne g(s)(k) ´ g ± ¢ ¢ ¢ ± g| {z }(k)
s
. It is easy to verify ~Z(k¤) = (B=(1¡ ¯))u(f(k¤)¡
k¤). Now we claim the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Assume ¹ 6= 1. Let S be a set such that
S = f k j j(¹f 0(k)¡ 1=¯)=(¹¡ 1)j < 1g ,
and take any point such that k¤ 2 S and k¤ 6= ¹k. Then:
(i) Self-consistent value functions ~Z(k) and Z¸(k), which are represented as an in¯nite series
SV1, where g(k) satis¯es EE2, uniformly converges and once continuously di®erentiable C1
on some open ball around k¤, k 2 B(k¤; "0), with "0 > 0.
(ii) In BE2, replace ~W (¢) and W¸ (¢) with ~Z(¢) and Z¸(¢), respectively. Then ~Z(¢) and Z¸(¢)
satisfy BE2 with a unique self-consistent policy function g(k).
(iii) Let S0 be a set such that S0 = f k j 0 < (¹f 0(k)¡ 1=¯)=(¹¡ 1) < 1g, and take any
point such that k¤ 2 S0, instead of S. Then ~Z(k) is strictly concave at k¤.
Proof is given in Appendix. By the proof ~Z(k) and Z¸(k) are also shown to be C1. Thus
BE2 is now formally justi¯ed as the following Bellman equation.
Z¸(k) = max
y2Y (k)
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~Z(y)
´
, (BE3)
where
~Z(k) = Z¸(k) + (B ¡A)u(C^),
and C^ = f(k)¡ y^ and y^ = argmax
y2Y (k)
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~Z(y)
´
.
Theorem 3 says that y^ in BE3 must be the same as g(k), if ~Z(k) and Z¸(k) are de¯ned as
SV1.
3.3 Instability against perturbation of self-consistent policy/value functions
In section 3.2, at ¯rst we searched out the policy functions, which satis¯es Euler equation
EE2 locally around a ¯xed point k¤, and then calculate the corresponding value functions.
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Therefore it is not still veri¯ed if deviated policy functions would necessarily converges to
some of self-consistent ones in a global sense. So we go back to a recursive Bellman equation
BE1'. At the terminal stage n = 0,
W¸1(k) = max
y2Y (k)
³
Au(f(k)¡ y) + ¯ ~W0(y)
´
,
where
~W1(k) = W¸1(k) + (B ¡A)u(C^).
Assume a log utility u(c) = ln c and a Cobb-Douglus form production function f(k) =
akb, although this utility does not satisfy condition U1. Assuming ~W0(k) = 0 (therefore
g0(k) = 0), it is easy to verify, by recursive calculation, that gn(k) = °nf(k), where °n =
¯¹bf1¡(¯b)ng
(1¡¯b)+¯¹bf1¡(¯b)ng , and gn(k) !k!1 g(k) = °f(k), where ° =
¯¹b
1¡¯b(1¡¹) . (g(k) = °f(k)
satis¯es self-consistent Euler equation EE2.) As a matter of fact, if g0(k) belongs to a family
of functions of a Cobb-Douglus form, g0(k) = °0f(k) (0 · °0 < 1), then it is proved that
gn(k) !
k!1
g(k) = °f(k), the same destination function. However, in general, every possible
initial policy function g0(k) might not necessarily attain a uniform convergence to g(k). This
point is totally di®erent from case of dynamic consistency ¹ = 1. (See Blackwell (1965) for
a contraction result in case of ¹ = 1.)
Here we limit our focus on the local stability against temporal perturbation of self-
consistent policy and value functions.
Theorem 4: Let h(k) be a C1 function, which is bounded in an open ball around k¤,
and h(k¤) 6= 0. Also let g(k) be a self-consistent policy function, which satis¯es EE2, and
let ~Z(k) be a corresponding self-consistent value function generated by SV1. Assume both
g(k) and ~Z(k) are C1 in an open ball around k¤.
(i) Assume that the next generation's policy function is subject to a perturbation of the
form: g(y) ! ~g(y; ´) = g(y) + ´h(y), and the current generation's policy function changes
g(k)! g^(k; ´).
Then the condition for the policy function's contraction in an open neighborhood around
k¤, k 2 B(k¤; "00) with some "00 > 0, is¯¯¯¯
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
½
1 + ¯(¹¡ 1)h
0(k¤)
h(k¤)
u0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
¾¯¯¯¯
< 1.
(ii) Assume that the next generation's value function is subject to a perturbation of the
form: ~Z(y)! ~Z(y; ´) = ~Z(y) + ´h(y), and the current generation's value function changes
~Z(k)! Z^(k; ´).
Then the condition for the value functions's contraction in an open neighborhood around
k¤, k 2 B(k¤; "00) with some "00 > 0, is¯¯¯¯
¯
½
1 + (¹¡ 1)h
0(k¤)
h(k¤)
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
u0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
¾¯¯¯¯
< 1.
Proof is given in Appendix. Both results (i) and (ii) are similar. In case of dynamic consis-
tency ¹ = 1, the contraction can be achieved under quite general conditions, jg0(k¤)=f 0(k¤)j <
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1 or ¯ < 1, in which the local convergence in sup norm kgn¡gkK !
n!1 0 or k ~Zn¡ ~ZkK !n!1 0
are attained, whatever the ¯rst order or the higher orders of perturbation (h0(k), h00(k),
h000(k) ¢ ¢) might be. However, in case of ¹ 6= 1, the ¯rst order perturbation h0(k) or the
¯rst order nondi®erentiability directly a®ects the possibility of 00th order contraction (in
sup norm), and so do the second or higher perturbation (h00(k), h000(k), ¢¢), or the nondi®er-
entiability in these orders, indirectly. So ¯nally in the next theorem we state the ¯rst order
e®ect on g^(k; ´) of perturbation h(k) around k¤, which is measured by g^12(k¤; 0).
Theorem 5: Consider the same assumptions as in (i) of Theorem 4. Then g^12(k¤; 0),
the ¯rst order e®ect of g^(k¤; ´) for a small change in ´h(y) is given in the following formula.
g^12(k¤; 0) = X0h(k) +X1h0(k) +X2h00(k),
where
X0 = ¡ g
0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
µ
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
ff 00(k¤)g0(k¤)¡ f 0(k¤)g00(k¤)g ¡ u
00(c¤)
u0(c¤)
ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)gf1¡ g0(k¤)g
¶
,
X1 =
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
0B@g0(k¤) + ¯(¹¡ 1)
264 g
0(k¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
¡ u0(c¤)u00(c¤) g
0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
Ã
ff 00(k¤)g0(k¤)¡ f 0(k¤)g00(k¤)g
+u
000(c¤)
u00(c¤)
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
! 375
1CA ,
X2 = ¯(¹¡ 1)fg
0(k¤)g2
f 0(k¤)
u0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
.
Proof is given in Appendix. Let ´hn(k) denote a functional deviation from self-consistent
policy function g(k) at stage n. In case of dynamic consistency ¹ = 1, then X1 =
fg0(k¤)g2
f 0(k¤)
and X2 = 0. From Theorem 4, hn(k¤) ! 0, as n ! 1. Since fg
0(k¤)g2
f 0(k¤) < 1, h
0
n(k¤)
proves to converge to zero. That is, qualitatively speaking, the order-by-order derivative
contraction operates in general. However, in case of dynamic inconsistency ¹ 6= 1, the higher
order derivative coe±cient a®ects the lower one, and the lower one, if failing in contraction,
remains an obstacle for contraction in the higher one, as n!1.
4. Concluding remarks
Thus this paper describes a dynamics of one-sector growth model under two sided altruism.
Here we derived a modi¯ed Euler equation for two-sided altruism dynamics.
From viewpoints of macrodynamics & game theory, one important implication of this
paper is that even under this perfect foresight setting with a perfectly rational representative
agent (in the sense that each generation takes account of and internalizes all the predictable
reaction by the subsequent generations), dynamic inconsistency still induces indeterminacy
of self-consistent policy functions, and possibly cause some dynamic °uctuation of policy
function generated in recursive fashion.
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This aspect is crucial not only in this two-sided altruism dynamics, but also in other
models incorporating irregular structures of variable e®ective discount factors, as in hyper-
bolic discount factor model, endogenized (so variable) discount factor model, or fertility
endogenized model.
This paper focused on self-consistency, di®erentiability, and fragility against recursive
perturbation of policy/value functions, in a local area around any arbitrary ¯xed point k¤.
Investigation on global transition in BE1 or (1'), characterized by dynamic °uctuation, will
be left for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
From the assumption, y^ is an interior of Y (k). Di®erentiating BE2 with k, we have
¡Au0(f(k) ¡ y^) + ¯ ~W 0(y^) = 0 (Ä). Then, since y^ = g(k) and g(k) is once continuously
di®erentiable,
W¸ 0(k) = Au0(f(k)¡ y^)f 0(k) +
µ
dy^
dk
¶h
¡Au0(f(k)¡ y^) + ¯ ~W 0(y^)
i
| {z }
=0
= Au0(f(k)¡ g(k))f 0(k).
Then, from ~W (k) = W¸ (k) + (B ¡A)u(f(k)¡ g(k)),
~W 0(k) = Au0(f(k)¡ g(k))f 0(k) + (B ¡A)u0(f(k)¡ g(k)) ff 0(k)¡ g0(k)g
= u0(f(k)¡ g(k))[Bf 0(k)¡ (B ¡A) g0(k)]
= Au0(f(k)¡ g(k))[¹f 0(k)¡ (¹¡ 1) g0(k)].
Plugging this into (Ä), ¡Au0(f(k) ¡ y) + ¯Au0(f(y) ¡ g(y)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(y)] = 0.
Divide this by A, ¯nally we get EE1. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2
At a ¯xed point g(k¤) = k¤, ¯[¹f 0(k¤) ¡ (¹ ¡ 1)g0(k¤)] = 1 holds. In case of ¹ 6= 1;
there exist an in¯nite number of combination of g(k¤) and g0(k¤). Take any arbitrary
point such that k¤ 6= ¹k. Then g0(k¤) 6= 0, and since g(k) is C1, there exists an open
neighborhood around k¤, B(k¤; "), such that " is enough small, and g0(k) > 0 or g0(k) < 0
for all k 2 B(k¤; "). u(¢) and f(¢) are C1, then applying the implicit function theorem
to EE2, g0(k) is C1 on B(k¤; ") (that is, g(k) is C2 (twice continuously di®erentiable)).
Di®erentiating EE2 with k, we get
¡ u00(f(k)¡ g(k))ff 0(k)¡ g0(k)g (EE2-2)
+ ¯
(
u00(f(y)¡ g(y)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(y)] ff 0(y)¡ g0(y)g
u0(f(y)¡ g(y)) [¹f 00(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(y)]
)
g0(k)
= 0.
Here y = g(k). Then at a ¯xed point k¤ with c¤ = f(k¤)¡ k¤,
¡ u00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
+ ¯
(
u00(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
u0(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)]
)
g0(k¤)
= 0.
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Arranging this with ¯[¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] = 1 (F), we have the following equality.
f1¡ g0(k¤)gu00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g = ¯g0(k¤)u0(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)] (?)
Thus, considering ¹ 6= 1, u0(c¤) 6= 0 and g0(k¤) 6= 0, g00(k¤) is uniquely determined.
Again applying the implicit function theorem to EE2-2, g00(k) is C1 on B(k¤; ") (that
is, g(k) is C3(three times continuously di®erentiable). Di®erentiating EE2-2 with k, and
setting at a ¯xed point k¤,
¡ u00(c¤)ff 00(k¤)¡ g00(k¤)g ¡ u000(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g2 (H)
+ ¯
8>>>><>>>>:
u000(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g2
+2u00(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
+u00(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] ff 00(k¤)¡ g00(k¤)g
+u0(c¤) [¹f 000(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g000(k¤)]
9>>>>=>>>>; fg
0(k¤)g2
+ ¯
(
u00(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
+u0(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)]
)
g00(k¤)
= 0.
Similarly, g000(k¤) is uniquely determined. Thus, by induction, g(k) is C1, and the n'th
order coe±cient of derivative at k¤, g(n)(k¤) say, is uniquely determined at any positive
integer n. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3
(i) It is easy to verify that k¤ 6= ¹k and k¤ 2 S imply g0(k¤) 6= 0 and jg0(k¤)j < 1. Then
there exists an open neighborhood around k¤, B(k¤; "0), such that "0 is enough small, and
1 > g0(k) > 0 or ¡1 < g0(k) < 0 for all k 2 B(k¤; "0). Then obviously,
g(s)(B(k¤; "0)) ½ g(s¡1)(B(k¤; "0)) ½ ¢ ¢ ¢ ½ g(B(k¤; "0)) ½ B(k¤; "0). (|)
Since u((f ¡ g)(k)) is positive and upper bounded on B(k¤; "0), it holds that ku((f ¡
g) ± g(s)(k))kB(k¤;"0) · M0 for all s ¸ 0, where kfkK ´ sup
k2K
jf(k)j. In addition, P1s=0¯sM0
converges, therefore, from Weierstrass's M test, an in¯nite functional series B
P1
s=0¯
su((f¡
g) ± g(s)(k)) uniformly converges to ~Z(k) on B(k¤; "0). Each term ¯su((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)) is
continuous on B(k¤; "0), so is ~Z(k) on B(k¤; "0).
Next, di®erentiating u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)) with k,
(u((f¡g)±g(s)(k)))0 = u0((f¡g)±g(s)(k))[(f 0¡g0)±(g(s)(k))][g0(g(s¡1)(k))]¢¢[g0(g(k))][g0(k)].
u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)) is C1, so (u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)))0 is continuous on B(k¤; "0). Consid-
ering (|), ku0((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k))kB(k¤;"0) · M1, k(f 0 ¡ g0) ± (g(s)(k))kB(k¤;"0) · M2 and
kg0(g(u¡1)(k))kB(k¤;"0) · 1 (0 · u · s). Therefore, k(u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)))0kB(k¤;"0) ·M1M2.
Furthermore
P1
s=0¯
sM1M2 converges, so B
P1
s=0¯
s(u((f¡g)±g(s)(k)))0 uniformly converges
and is continuous on B(k¤; "0).
Summarizing the above, (1) B
P1
s=0¯
su((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)) converges to ~Z(k), (2) u((f ¡
g) ± g(s)(k)) is C1, (3) B
P1
s=0¯
s(u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)))0 uniformly converges. From (1), (2)
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and (3), the conditions for the term-by-term di®erentiability, ~Z(k) is C1, and ~Z 0(k) =
B
P1
s=0¯
s(u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)))0. The proof of the uniform convergence and C1 (once di®er-
entiability) of Z¸(k) is now straightforward.
(ii) By the proof of (i), ~Z 0(k) = B
P1
s=0¯
s(u((f ¡ g) ± g(s)(k)))0. Then at a ¯xed point
k = k¤,
~Z 0(k¤) = B
P1
s=0[¯
su0(c¤) ¢ (f ¡ g)0(k¤) ¢ fg0(k¤)gs]
= Bu0(c¤) ¢ (f ¡ g)0(k¤) ¢P1s=0fg0(k¤)gs
= Bu0(c¤) ¢ (f ¡ g)0(k¤) ¢ 1
1¡ g0(k¤) ,
where c¤ = f(k¤) ¡ k¤. g(k) is, by de¯nition, a solution of EE2 with a ¯xed point
g(k¤) = k¤ and (F). Then
¯[¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] = 1() ¡Au0(c¤) + ¯Bu0(c¤) ¢ (f ¡ g)0(k¤) ¢ 11¡g0(k¤) = 0()
¡Au0(c¤) + ¯ ~Z 0(k¤) = 0 (N).
Now de¯ne ºg(k) ´ argmaxy2Y (k)(Au(f(k)¡y)+¯ ~Z(y)). Then ºg(k) is the only candidate
solution of BE3. Since ºg(k¤) ´ argmaxy2Y (k¤)(Au(f(k¤) ¡ y) + ¯ ~Z(y)), and by (N), we
have ºg(k¤) = k¤. If ºg(k) is a solution of BE3, then by similar calculation as in Theorem
1, ºg(k) proves to be a solution of EE2. Since ºg(k) has a ¯xed point at k¤, by Theorem
2, ºg(k) is uniquely determined at the neighborhood around k¤, therefore it must be that
ºg(k) = g(k) on B(k¤; "). It is obvious that if ºg(k) = g(k), then Z¸(k), generated as ~Z(k) =
Z¸(k)+ (B¡A)u(f(k)¡ºg(k)) in BE3, coincides with Z¸(k), as de¯ned in SV1. Now we have
proved that ~Z(k) and Z¸(k) satisfy BE3 with a unique self-consistent policy function g(k).
(iii) Next we prove a strict concavity of ~Z(k) at k = k¤. From the proof of Theorem
1, ~Z 0(k) = ~W 0(k) = Au0(f(k) ¡ g(k))[¹f 0(k) ¡ (¹¡ 1) g0(k)]. (It is easy to verify that
~Z 0(k¤) = (A=¯)u0(c¤) > 0, where c¤ = f(k¤)¡k¤.) As g(k) is C1 on B(k¤; "0), so ~Z(k) and
Z¸(k) are also C1 on it. Again di®erentiating ~Z 0(k) with k,
~Z 00(k) = A
"
u00(f(k)¡ g(k))ff 0(k)¡ g0(k)gf¹f 0(k)¡ (¹¡ 1) g0(k)g
+u0(f(k)¡ g(k))f¹f 00(k)¡ (¹¡ 1) g00(k)g
#
.
At k = k¤, using (F),
~Z 00(k¤) = A
"
u00(c¤)ff(0k¤)¡ g0(k¤)gf¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1) g0(k¤)g
+u0(c¤)f¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1) g00(k¤)g
#
=
A
¯
[u00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g+ ¯u0(c¤)f¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1) g00(k¤)g]
=
A
¯
·
u00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g+ (1¡ g
0(k¤))
g0(k¤)
u00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
¸
=
A
¯g0(k¤)
u00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g.
Here we used the equality (?). From conditions U0 and U2, u00(c¤) < 0. The assumption
k¤ 2 S0 assures 0 < g0(k¤) < 1=¯, which implies f 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤) > 0. Therefore now we have
~Z 00(k¤) < 0, a desired result. ¤
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Proof of Theorem 4
(i) In EE1 replace g(y) with ~g(y; ´), and g^(k) with g^(k; ´), respectively, then we have:
EE(3) ¡u0(f(k) ¡ y) + ¯u0(f(y) ¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] = 0, where y =
g^(k; ´) and g^(k; 0) = ~g(k; 0) = g(k).
Di®erentiating with ´,
u00(f(k)¡ y)g^2(k; ´) (?)
+ ¯
266664
¡u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ~g2(y; ´)
¡u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [(¹¡ 1)~g12(y; ´)](
u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ff 0(y)¡ ~g1(y; ´)g
u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 00(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g11(y; ´)]
)
g^2(k; ´)
377775
= 0.
Arranging this equation:
g^2(k; ´)
264 u
00(f(k)¡ y)
+¯
(
u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ff 0(y)¡ ~g1(y; ´)g
u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 00(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g11(y; ´)]
) 375
= ¯
"
u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ~g2(y; ´)
+u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [(¹¡ 1)~g12(y; ´)]
#
Evaluating ´ = 0 and k = k¤ (f(k¤)¡ k¤ = c¤, k¤ = g(k¤)), with (F):
g^2(k¤; 0)
"
u00(c¤) + u00(c¤) ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
+¯u0(c¤)
h
¹f
00
(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)
i #
= u00(c¤)~g2(k¤; 0) + ¯(¹¡ 1)u0(c¤)~g12(k¤; 0)
From equality (?),
u00(c¤) + u00(c¤) ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g+ ¯u0(c¤)
h
¹f
00
(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)
i
= u00(c¤)
f 0(k¤)
g0(k¤)
.
So we obtain
g^2(k¤; 0) =
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
½
~g2(k¤; 0) + ¯(¹¡ 1) u
0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
~g12(k¤; 0)
¾
.
Evaluating at k = k¤ and ´ = 0, with ~g(k; ´) = g(k) + ´h(k), ~g2(k¤; 0) = h(k¤) and
~g12(k¤; 0) = h0(k¤),
g^2(k¤; 0)
~g2(k¤; 0)
=
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
½
1 + ¯(¹¡ 1) u
0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
h0(k¤)
h(k¤)
¾
.
g^2(k¤; 0) and ~g2(k¤; 0) are the slopes of changes of the current and next generation's policy
functions in a small change of ´, evaluated at k = k¤ and ´ = 0, respectively. So this is a
desired result.
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(ii) The F.O.C. (Euler eq.) of BE3 is ¡Au0(f(k) ¡ y) + ¯ ~Z 0(y) = 0. Replacing y with
g^(k; ´), and ~Z(y) with ~Z(y; ´), then ¡Au0(f(k) ¡ g^(k; ´)) + ¯ ~Z1(g^(k; ´); ´) = 0 (]). Di®er-
entiating with ´,
Au00(f(k)¡ g^(k; ´))g^2(k; ´) + ¯
³
~Z11(g^(k; ´); ´)g^2(k; ´) + ~Z12(g^(k; ´); ´)
´
= 0.
Then we have
g^2(k; ´) =
¡¯ ~Z12(g^(k; ´); ´)
Au00(f(k)¡ g^(k; ´)) + ¯ ~Z11(g^(k; ´); ´)
. (y)
The current generation's value function Z^(k; ´) is calculated as Z^(k; ´) = Bu(f(k) ¡
g^(k; ´)) + ¯ ~Z(g^(k; ´); ´). Then
Z^2(k; ´) = ¡Bu0(f(k)¡ g^(k; ´))g^2(k; ´) + ¯
³
~Z1(g^(k; ´); ´)g^2(k; ´) + ~Z2(g^(k; ´); ´)
´
( z)
= (A¡B)u0(f(k)¡ g^(k; ´))g^2(k; ´) + ¯ ~Z2(g^(k; ´); ´).
Here we used the equality (]). Also ~Z2(g^(k; ´); ´) = h(g^(k; ´)) and ~Z12(g^(k; ´); ´) =
h0(g^(k; ´)). Then plugging (y) into (z),
Z^2(k; ´) = ¯h(g^(k; ´))
½
1¡ h
0(g^(k; ´))
h(g^(k; ´))
¢ (A¡B)u
0(f(k)¡ g^(k; ´))
Au00(f(k)¡ g^(k; ´)) + ¯ ~Z11(g^(k; ´); ´)
¾
.
Evaluating at k = k¤ and ´ = 0, with g^(k¤; 0) = g(k¤) = k¤, c¤ ´ f(k¤) ¡ k¤ and
~Z11(g^(k¤; 0); 0) = ~Z 00(k¤) = A¯g0(k¤)u
00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g,
Z^2(k¤; 0)
~Z2(k¤; 0)
= ¯
(
1¡ h
0(k¤)
h(k¤)
¢ (A¡B)u
0(c¤)
Au00(c¤) + Ag0(k¤)u
00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
)
= ¯
(
1¡ h
0(k¤)
h(k¤)
¢ (1¡ ¹)u
0(c¤)
u00(c¤) + 1g0(k¤)u
00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
)
= ¯
½
1 + (¹¡ 1)h
0(k¤)
h(k¤)
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
u0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
¾
.
Z^2(k¤; 0) and ~Z2(k¤; 0)(= h(k¤)) are the slopes of changes of the current and next gener-
ation's value functions in a small change of ´, evaluated at k = k¤ and ´ = 0, respectively.
This is also a desired result. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5
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Di®erentiating (?) with k,
u00(f(k)¡ y)g^12(k; ´) + u000(f(k)¡ y)ff 0(k)¡ g^1(k; ´)gg^2(k; ´)
+ ¯
26666666666666666666664
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Ã
¡u000(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´))ff 0(k)¡ g^1(k; ´)g [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)]
¡u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 00(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g11(y; ´)]
!
~g2(y; ´)
+
Ã
¡u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)]
¡(¹¡ 1)u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´))ff 0(k)¡ g^1(k; ´)g
!
~g12(y; ´)
¡u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [(¹¡ 1)~g112(y; ´)]
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
g^1(k; ´)
8>>>><>>>>:
u000(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ff 0(y)¡ ~g1(y; ´)g2
2u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 00(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g11(y; ´)] ff 0(y)¡ ~g1(y; ´)g
u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ff 00(y)¡ ~g11(y; ´)g
u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 000(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g111(y; ´)]
9>>>>=>>>>; g^1(k; ´)g^2(k; ´)(
u00(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 0(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g1(y; ´)] ff 0(y)¡ ~g1(y; ´)g
u0(f(y)¡ ~g(y; ´)) [¹f 00(y)¡ (¹¡ 1)~g11(y; ´)]
)
g^12(k; ´)
37777777777777777777775
= 0.
Evaluating ´ = 0 and k = k¤ (f(k¤)¡ k¤ = c¤, k¤ = g(k¤)),
u00(c¤)g^12(k¤; 0) + u000(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)gg^2(k¤; 0)
+ ¯
2666666666664
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Ã
¡u000(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)]
¡u00(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)]
!
~g2(k¤; 0)
+
Ã
¡u00(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)]
¡(¹¡ 1)u00(c¤)ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
!
~g12(k¤; 0)
¡u0(c¤) [(¹¡ 1)~g112(k¤; 0)]
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
g0(k¤)
+S ¢ g0(k¤) ¢ g^2(k¤; 0)
+T ¢ g^12(k¤; 0)
3777777777775
= 0,
where
S =
8>>>><>>>>:
u000(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g2
+2u00(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
+u00(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤)] ff 00(k¤)¡ g00(k¤)g
+u0(c¤) [¹f 000(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g000(k¤)]
9>>>>=>>>>; ,
and
T =
(
u00(c¤) [¹f 0(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g0(k¤))] ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g
u0(c¤) [¹f 00(k¤)¡ (¹¡ 1)g00(k¤)]
)
.
From (H), (F) and (?), S and T are respectively calculated as
S =
1
¯fg0(k¤)g2
·
u00(c¤)
½
f 00(k¤)¡ f 0(k¤)g
00(k¤)
g0(k¤)
¾
+ u000(c¤) ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g2
¸
,
T =
1
¯g0(k¤)
u00(c¤) ff 0(k¤)¡ g0(k¤)g .
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By Theorem 4, we already have
g^2(k¤; 0) =
g0(k¤)
f 0(k¤)
½
h(k¤) + ¯(¹¡ 1) u
0(c¤)
u00(c¤)
h0(k¤)
¾
.
Obviously ~g2(k¤; 0) = h(k¤), ~g12(k¤; 0) = h0(k¤), ~g112(k¤; 0) = h00(k¤). Then plugging all
of these into (?), and arranging, again, with (F) and (?), we derive desired results. ¤
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